

Morality: Hume's Point of View: Where Morality Comes From (and Where it Does Not)

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The question of whether morals reside in the domain of fact or passion is a central quandary concerning any theory of the existence of morals. Hume denies that morality is a matter of reason; the consequence of this appears to be that there are no objective morals, but when examined carefully I will show that through understanding Hume's conception of passion and virtue; this claim is false. I intend to put fourth an argument that passion is not rooted in reason, it merely yields to reason. I will explain how reason is the discovery of a relation which can be neither true nor false. I will explicate and defend Hume's positions that morals cannot be derived from reason. Than I aim to clarify virtues and vice for Hume. In doing so I intend to show that Hume's position concerning morality is that of an ideal observer. In effect showing that although Hume denies that morality is a matter of reason the consequence of this is not that there are no objective morals.

Friday 26 October, 4.45 to 5.45 pm, LA 271
Chair: Malcolm Murray

Language Origin in Plato's *Cratylus*

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I argue that the mostly neglected etymology section of Plato's *Cratylus* can provide interesting insights regarding Plato's view about the origin of human language. The theories of naming developed in *Cratylus* focus mainly on perceptible qualities of objects, which are imitated by the shapes and sounds of letters. While a good name will express the essence of an object it does so relying on surface features, just as a good painting. I explore whether or not this focus on sound-portraits commits Plato to an empiricist theory of language evolution.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 174
Chair: Kevin McCain

The Bicameral Western Mind: Athens & Jerusalem

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In the shadow of the grim events of the twentieth century, and in the light of the writings of Emmanuel Levinas, one might be tempted to explore an inspiration that is not Athenian, but breathes the air of Jerusalem. We begin by exploring a language that comes to us from the Other rather than the Self (where Athens always begins), a language of relationship rather than utility, of pronouns before nouns, of passive verbs before active, of polysemy rather than univocity, of law as discourse rather than code, of caress rather than grasp. Levinas, following Talmudic tradition, rejects the Self-oriented Athenian worldview and puts ethics, rather than ontology or epistemology, at the centre of philosophy. A text from the Babylonian Talmud about Akhnai, the serpentine oven, opens these issues to us, and serves as a key to understanding Levinas and his followers.

Saturday 27 October, 1.30 to 2.30 pm, LA 175

Chair: Susan Dielman

Reflexive Awareness and Self-Knowledge

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I present and defend an interpretation of the theory of Reflexive awareness of Dignaga – an Indian Buddhist philosopher of the 5th century – as providing a theory of the special epistemic access we have to our own conscious mental episodes. Reflexive awareness (svasamvedana) is the claim that a conscious mental event is not only directed at some object (or content) but that it is also, by the same token, aware of itself. If this view is correct, then in the same way that visual perception is the direct epistemic basis for visual knowledge, Reflexive awareness is the direct epistemic basis for Self-Knowledge. On the basis of my rational reconstruction of a classical argument known as “the memory argument”, I argue that the theory of Reflexive awareness is to be preferred to two rival theories namely what I call the Immediately Succeeding Cognition view and the Inferential view.

Friday 26 October, 4.45 to 5.45 pm, LA 175

Chair: Monique Lanoix

Getting a Sense of Hegel’s Method

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The goal of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the achievement of absolute, or unconditioned, knowledge. Yet, in order to do this Hegel could not even assume the method with which such a project could be achieved. Therefore, the very method, the dialectical logic, of the Phenomenology had to be introduced at some point in the very investigation for which it would become the driving force. This paper attempts to show how this methodological introduction takes place in the opening section on "Sense Certainty" without compromising the integrity of the overall project of the Phenomenology. What will be seen in laying this out is that Hegel does in fact achieve an unconditioned grounding for our knowledge of the world; however, this knowledge is not ontological but rather methodological. That is, Hegel succeeds in establishing one of the most powerful justifications to date of a fallibilistic approach to our understanding of the world.

Hegel Symposium in Honour of H.S. Harris, Saturday 27 October, 9.45 am to 12 noon, LA 174

Chair: Stephen Boos

Judgment and justification in Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Action

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Arendt asserts that the ability to act freely is a necessary condition for human beings to live a politically engaged and human life. This assertion is founded on her reading of Kant's theory of judgment. However, she did little in the way of providing a justification for the validity of this claim and unfortunately, she died before completing her justification. This paper is an attempt to determine if Kant's faculty of judgment is sufficient to guarantee Arendt's view of the freedom of political action.

Saturday 27 October, 8.30 to 9.30 am, LA 173

Chair: Jonathan Blair

Names and Semantic Content

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Two of the most influential types of theories of names are definite description and direct reference theories. In this paper, I argue that neither of those types of theories, as they are normally conceived, can tell us about the semantic content of a name. I will then endorse a variant of a definite description theory given by Kent Bach, called the nominal description theory. I will argue that this theory can and does tell us what the semantic

content of a name is. However, I will further argue that Bach's theory is essentially an error theory – when we use a name in a sentence, what we say is always literally false. I will offer a modification to Bach's theory, which makes what we say not literally false, but merely incomplete, and will show that this is a fruitful trade-off.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 275
Chair: Christina Behme

Aesthetic Unity and 'No Great Mischief'

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It is common to believe that great works of art sustain multiple interpretations. I argue that this is mistaken, and illustrate my claim with a reading of Alistair MacLeod's 'No Great Mischief'. The novel is held together by an 'epiphany scene'- a scene that is essential for reading the novel correctly.

Saturday 27 October, 9.45 to 10.45 am, LA 275
Chair: Jason Holt

The Social Construction of the Body and the Male Medical Norm: Representing Marginalized Subjects in Science

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In this paper, I explore the ramifications of the feminist argument that there can be no such thing as a value-neutral science. Though many feminists agree that the medical sciences are androcentrist (accepting the male subject as the universal medical norm), we lack consensus regarding why this is the case. Feminists such as Sue Rosser and Helen Longino argue that the granting of institutional equality will improve the medical sciences. I argue that a focus on equality, while a necessary condition for the correction of assumptions in the medical sciences, is not sufficient; what is also required is a fundamental examination of the reciprocal effects between marginalized subjects and the institutional discourses that inform their identities. This program demands the inclusion of feminine voices, but it also provides a critical framework within which we can examine what those voices are saying. Feminists who focus solely on equality will systematically lack this important evaluative dimension.

Saturday 27 October, 9.45 to 10.45 am, LA 271

Chair: Rosalind Raddatz

**Compositional & Functional Matter:
Aristotle on the Material Cause of Biological Organisms**

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Some commentators have argued that Aristotle uses two kinds of material cause in his account of biological organisms. The one, their compositional matter, persists through their birth and death; the other, their functional matter, consists of the organs out of which they are made while they are alive. Moreover, the explanatory role of these two material causes is quite different. Compositional matter is only contingently connected to living organisms and contributes nothing necessary to them; functional matter is necessarily connected to living organisms and is responsible for a number of their essential functions. Against this view, I argue that the organs and functional parts of biological organisms do not constitute a second kind of material cause, distinct from their compositional matter, because the functional matter of biological organisms is systematically dependent upon their compositional matter. The unity of biological organisms does not exclude a persisting material cause with a nature of its own, necessary to the living substance made from it.

Friday 26 October, 4.45 to 5.45 pm, LA 174
Chair: Mark C.R. Smith

What is Technology?

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In this paper, I will be exploring some of the key features of technology. While not trying to pin down its essence, I would like to propose a set of features and characteristics that make technology 1) even more common than many people suspect and 2) fundamental to our lived experience. Our world is a technological fabric and our day-to-day potentialities, thoughts, and actions are saturated with technology. Indeed, technology has become (and has long been) a primary mode of human existence. My approach in this paper is phenomenological in the Heideggerian tradition. In short, technology is a way of being-in-the-world. I will correct a 'gadget' definition of technology that suggests that technology is a collection of gadgets or tools humans employ to do useful work. Rather, technology is what makes us and our world possible.

Saturday 27 October, 1.30 to 2.30 pm, LA 173

Chair: Lynn Panting

Dennett and Lone-Wolf Phenomenology

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In my paper I examine Daniel Dennett's position in the philosophy mind, which he calls heterophenomenology and his argument against the traditional phenomenological method espoused by Edmund Husserl. As I will show, Dennett's key argument relies upon a misunderstanding. In short, Dennett conflates phenomenology with introspection, which he takes to be detrimental to a scientific understanding of consciousness. This paper, therefore, has two objectives: first, I will demonstrate why phenomenology is not introspection; second, I will argue that one can still maintain a scientific study of consciousness while taking the first-person perspective seriously. In order to accomplish the second objective I will appeal to scientific projects that try to combine phenomenological analysis with current research in cognitive science without reducing one to the other, namely neurophenomenology as espoused by Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson. I believe that neurophenomenology is more successful than Dennett's heterophenomenology because it takes both phenomenology and cognitive science seriously without reducing each to the other.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.34 pm, LA 175
Chair: Doug Mackay

Understanding Deontological and Consequential Reasoning in the Harm Reduction Debate: A Virtue Ethics Antidote

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Background: Harm reduction interventions such as Supervised Injection Sites and Needle Exchange Programs have been proven to prevent many of the negative consequences of problematic substance use. Yet many governments, including the United States and Canada, do not endorse these interventions claiming that tolerating substance use is equivalent to tacitly approving of it, thus, sending the wrong message.

Objective: This paper will analyze moral objections to harm reduction using the ethical theories of John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant and Aristotle. Results: Most objections to harm reduction are not scientific in nature rather they are moral objections rooted in the value that abstinence-based approaches to policy making should take priority over harm reduction approaches. Conclusions: We conclude harm reduction makes sense, is superior to alternative policy approaches to problematic substance use and the ethical objections to harm reduction are not insurmountable.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.45 pm, LA 174
Chair: Sheila Mason

What Do Bad Words Mean?

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In this paper I explore various ways in which we can account for the meaning of derogatory words. These sorts of words are philosophically interesting because the theories typically put forward to account for their meaning are usually markedly different than the accounts given for non-derogatory words. Some have argued that certain derogatory words in fact have no meaning (while most other words would have a specifiable meaning); others that there is both a descriptive and evaluative aspect to the meanings of these terms (while most other words are solely descriptive). Most recently, Robert Brandom has offered an inferentialist account of meaning that does not require such a bifurcated approach. I examine the merits of this account, and offer what I take to be a puzzle that any theory of the semantics of derogatory words must come to grips with, and I conclude with what I propose is a better theory.

Saturday 27 October, 9.45 to 10.45 am, LA 175
Chair: Jason Breen

The War Inside Rawls

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Rawls disputed Hobbes' thesis that the "state of nature is, essentially and for all practical purposes, a state of war." What is war for social designers? Is war an "ever present possibility" which structures all circumstances of justice? From 1939-43, Rawls read intensely about war. From 1943-46, he served in General MacArthur's Pacific campaigns. Rawls became a Vietnam War critic, but this ended in frustration about philosophy changing history. In *A Theory of Justice* (1971), war was mostly set aside. In

the 1990s, war emerged as an essential theoretical challenge but the developing absence of war among constitutional democracies grounded his hope for a future where public reason overpowers force. Thus, while showing that thinking about war is a necessity, Rawls shows how to think about war without letting it dominate reason. Ultimately, Rawls' search for justice hopes to find the human way out of all war.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.45 pm, LA 271

Chair: Greg Scherkoske

Light and Mind in Aristotle's *De Anima*

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In this paper I argue that the analogy in *De Anima* between thinking and light has not been sufficiently understood. I explain how every single detail in Aristotle's analysis of the role of light in vision in *De Anima* II.7 helps to clarify his explanation of thinking in III.5. In particular, the distinction between light and the source of light in II.7 is central for showing how Aristotle investigates both human and divine mind in *De Anima* III.5. My interpretation suggests that Aristotle's argument about the first principle is even closer to Plato's allegory of the sun at *Republic* 509b than has previously been supposed.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 174

Chair: C. Byrne

Revolution or Reform: Rortyan Methods of Social Change

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In his essay "Feminism and Pragmatism," Richard Rorty argues that feminists will achieve justice when "the linguistic and other practices of the common culture have come to incorporate some of the practices characteristic of imaginative and courageous outcasts" (248-249). In other words, injustices can be remedied through cultural and symbolic re-imaginings and re-descriptions that are absorbed by the common culture. In this paper, I explore whether Rorty's view is inherently evolutionary and reformist – an accusation leveled at Rorty by many feminist theorists – or whether his view can be stretched to accommodate more radical and revolutionary re-visionings. In answering this question, I explore Rorty's work in relation to Iris Marion Young's predominantly liberal view, as outlined in *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, and the more radical view of Nancy Fraser, who, in *Justice Interruptus*, argues that liberal frameworks are

more problematic than they are helpful, and that revolution, rather than reform, is the preferred method of bringing about social change.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 173

Chair: Alice MacLachlan

Beauty and Time

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Paul Guyer's "Harmony of the Faculties Revisited" gives a general criticism of both precognitive and multicognitive approaches to the harmony of the faculties. Since, both, any object, and any object of thought, need involve determinate concepts (as per principle of apperception) the aesthetic judgement must involve determinate concepts. Aesthetic judgement is then divided: an aesthetic response (indeterminate) and an aesthetic judgement (determinate). However, the principle of apperception cannot ground an absolute distinction between aesthetic response and aesthetic judgement. If the distinction between them is one of potential to be conceptualized versus activity of conceptualization (given the nature of indeterminate concepts), the second act has no authentic target with which to perform its act of validation, and therefore is superfluous.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 271

Chair: Zoran Jankovic

Why "Discovery" Matters: Values All the Way Down

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In a 1988 paper, Keller criticizes the ideal of pure, value-free theoretical science. The claim she makes that genetics and nuclear physics contain within them "not only the possibility but the expectation" of eugenics and the bomb tends to be dismissed as a consequence of problem choice, hence epistemically irrelevant because part of the context of discovery. In *Experience and Prediction*, Reichenbach uses three distinctions to demarcate epistemology from psychology and sociology: context of discovery vs. justification, internal vs. external relations, and truth vs. volition. This last distinction is found to be most relevant to Keller's critique. Appeal is made to Reichenbach's concept of volitional bifurcation and Dewey's pragmatism to argue that Keller is right – "discovery" matters.

Saturday 27 October, 11 am to 12 noon, LA 271

Chair: Brian Leahy

Unlivable Gender: What Can Husserl Offer?

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In *Undoing Gender*, Judith Butler writes “let me start, then, in the spirit of Edmund Husserl, who claimed that philosophy was, after all, a perpetual beginning” (2004, 234). This is the only mention of Husserl in a book that shares a deep affinity with early phenomenology. I focus on discussions of the unintelligibility of certain genders. Butler considers how trans genders are impossible to live because of the dichotomous gender norms of our society, which make alternatives impossible. In this paper, I argue that Husserl provides a way of capturing both Butler’s disheartening insight and her modest hope for change. He does this by balancing two approaches. In the first, he moves from subjectivity to its grounding in the lifeworld, and in the second, from the lifeworld to subjectivity. He notes, modestly, that this is bound to be an endless task. I conclude that Husserl’s method is useful for capturing the philosophical insight of Butler’s views without compromising their radical nature. I take this to show that Husserl’s philosophy is relevant for contemporary debates.

Friday 26 October, 4.45 to 5.45 pm, LA 275
Chair: Bryan Smyth

Can Social Trust Survive the So-Called War on Terror?

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To cooperate and function in society, people need to rely on each other and to do so with a kind of confidence grounded in positive expectations about each other’s character, motivation, and competence. Centrally important in this regard is trust, which involves feelings, beliefs, attitudes, and interpretive dispositions. Trust in other people is required in many areas of endeavour, as we can see from even a cursory consideration of the attitudes presumed when driving, shopping, learning, or consulting professionals. Social trust is rather like clean air: we take it for granted until we begin to lose it. Then we notice, and appreciate its importance. (I developed this position in a 1997 book, *Social Trust and Human Communities*.) Fears of terrorist activity in the wake of attacks of September 11, 2001 pose profound challenges to social trust. In response to these challenges, five broad social strategies are considered. Among the possibilities are racial profiling and conspiracy theorizing. In this presentation I consider pros and cons of each strategy.

The Rowland Marshall Lecture in Public Philosophy, Thursday 25 October, 7.00 pm,
Scotiabank Theatre, Sobey Building

Moral Monsters and the Unforgivable

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ARPA 2007 Keynote Address, Friday 26 October, 7.30 pm, Room 255, Sobey Building

The Thought Theory of Emotion

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In this paper I argue that none of the five phenomena identified with emotion episodes in the philosophy and psychology literature represent the emotions themselves. Proceeding from the conceptual axiom that emotion episodes are experiences, I argue that emotions are constituted by mental events, specifically, thoughts and, to a lesser extent, images. A particular kind of emotion episode is differentiated from other kinds by the content of the thoughts and images. What makes the sequence of thoughts and images count as a single emotion episode is that there is a thematic, or topical, unity to the sequence. What distinguishes emotion episodes from other mental act sequences is that the topic of the content is imposed on us. The topic is not chosen as in the case of a reasoning sequence. This explains our experience of emotion as something imposed on us, rather than something we do.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 271
Chair: Charlene Weaving

Is This Not a Photo Opportunity?: the ethics of tourist photography

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Hundreds of millions of candid photos are taken by tourists every day without the photographer asking permission of their subjects. “Codes of ethics for travellers” often

single out photography for special censure. In this paper I will articulate three criticisms of photography offered by those who find tourist photography ethically problematic. First, photography can objectify the people being photographed; second, photography is a power-relation of domination between the photographer and the photographed; and third, the act of photography can be alienating and inauthentic for the photographer. In short, photography is said to be an intrusive, degrading, and inauthentic activity. But is this so? I argue that it is not. Tourists are unfairly singled out for ethical criticism that is not applied to other areas of life; and the criticism fails to give credit to the “reportage” philosophy of photography that guides the aesthetic of most photographers—even lowly tourists.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 283
Chair: Tamara Adler

Ownmost Responsibility: Singularization and Care

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In this paper, I argue that both singularity and relationality are necessary conditions of responsible selfhood. I draw on Heidegger’s account of authentic singularization and ethics of care accounts of interpersonal relationships to characterize singularity and relationality, respectively. I argue that Heidegger’s notion of singularization should be seen as a necessary condition of responsibility, while his account of care for others is unsatisfying, as it constitutes what I term a caretaking. I then argue that ethics of care accounts’ presentation of one’s need for care from others should be maintained in an adequate account of responsibility, while criticizing these views for over-problematizing the notion of the individual. My own account of the responsible self maintains both singularization and relationality, as characterized here, as necessary conditions of responsibility, and I further argue that responsible caregiving for particular others should be seen as one way of enacting responsibility so conceived.

Friday 26 October, 1 to 2 pm, LA 175
Chair: Lisa Kretz

Illness and Imagination

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This paper originates in Jan Zwicky’s suggestion that imagination is a sensitivity to resonance, and the further suggestion that the institution of mainstream analytic

philosophy, in its identification of clarity with analysis, discourages the imaginative, resonance-sensitive thinking which is necessary for the experience of meaning. I discuss Zwicky's meditations on resonance, and her suggestion that philosophical clarity can assume the form of resonance. I support my thesis with Jennifer Church's claim that the mentally ill, specifically depressives, suffer from an impaired imagination, which impairment is congruent with a failure to experience meaning. I consider the political implications of Zwicky and Church's work, including Freud's warning that "a severance between time/logic-dominated thought and music/image-dominated thought [is] the pre-eminent condition for the development of neurosis." I conclude that the Western post-industrial culture of philosophy diminishes itself by dismissing the legitimacy of imagination – and, in so doing, creates prime conditions for the development of illness.

Saturday 27 October, 8.30 to 9.30 am, LA 174
Chair: Amy Butchart

Heidegger's Primordially Requirement, Projective Breakdown, and the Phenomenology of Feeling

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This paper begins by discussing the structure of the analysis of the first three chapters of Division Two of *Being and Time* as it unfolds around the pursuit of primordially of interpretation. Aside from the holistic and authenticity requirements, there is what I call the 'phenomenological requirement', *viz.*, that the basic interpretive concepts of the existential analysis be drawn from a "basic experience" of be-ing-here. This requirement demands 'existentiell' attestation of the existential project (ie., fulfillment of the intention) and I show that this primarily means the *factual disclosure of "dis-position" (Befindlichkeit)* - in the attunements of mood and affect (*Stimmungen*). Coupled with the breakdown and nullity of projective understanding, in being-toward-death and in conscience, this interpretative situation opens up the possibility and phenomenological necessity of a phenomenology of feeling (used as a broad term for all 'attuned' disclosure), even from *within* Heidegger's own philosophical project. This phenomenology, however, must be one that escapes the 'projective prejudice' governing Heidegger's own interpretation of moods.

Friday 26 October, 1 to 2 pm, LA 174
Chair: John MacKinnon

The Supreme Court of Canada, or, two conceptions of harm

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In the 2005 Labaye decision, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada calls for a narrow harm-based approach to laws governing indecency and obscenity. This is in contrast to the 1992 Butler decision, which allows for a broader range of considerations when assessing the nature and also the degree of harm. Both decisions draw on the writings of John Stuart Mill, albeit to very different ends. Put another way, the contrast between these two decisions stems, in large part, from an emphasis on negative liberty in Labaye and on positive liberty in Butler. In this paper, these points are elaborated on and the positive liberty conception argued for. Ultimately, it will be shown that Labaye fails to adequately account for an important aspect of human liberty, namely, autonomy – an aspect to which Butler is highly attuned.

Saturday 27 October, 11 am to 12 noon, LA 275
Chair: Sung-Min Kang

Nativism: In Defense of the Representational Interpretation

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Linguistic competence, in general terms, involves the ability to learn, understand, and speak a language. Nativism holds that linguistic competence is explained by and large by an innate faculty of linguistic cognition or what Chomsky calls a ‘human language acquisition device’. In this paper, close scrutiny is given to nativism’s fundamental commitments vis-à-vis metaphysics. In the course of this exploration it is uncovered that any prima facie defensible variety of nativism is, for better or worse, wedded to two theses: linguistic competence is grounded in a faculty of linguistic cognition that is (i) embodied and (ii) represented in one’s neurophysiology.

Saturday 27 October, 1.30 to 2.30 pm, LA 275
Chair: Nicholas Ray

Neuroaesthetics and Art Theory

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Although philosophers, even recently, have been skeptical about whether the cognitive sciences can contribute anything significant to our understanding of art, and although scientists’ ventures into art theory have, for the most part, confirmed these suspicions, I argue that “neuroaesthetics” (so described by Zeki) has a crucial role to play in further

developments in aesthetic theory. In particular, I argue that a controversial proposal by Ramachandran and Hirstein, which is clearly misguided in some respects, nonetheless dovetails, at a more abstract level, with a longstanding tradition in aesthetics running from Aristotle to Iseminger. I further argue that besides providing the means to verify certain aspects of aesthetic theory, neuroaesthetics has the potential to fill in important gaps that remain in such conceptions of art, and help defend them from, among others, so-called anti-aesthetic objections.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 187
Chair: Ethan McMonagle

Hermeneutics and Narrativity: The problem of the Self in Heidegger and Ricœur

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Martin Heidegger was the first to envisage the transformation of phenomenology into hermeneutics. Paul Ricœur also defined his own philosophical project as a hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology. In the broad context of this “interpretative turn” of phenomenology, common to both Heidegger and Ricœur, we isolate the problem of the “self”. More precisely, we attempt to confront their respective conceptions of the self. Heidegger understands it as originary time of Care, while Ricœur, rather, sees it as narrative identity. Our analysis is focused on a few decisive pages in the third volume of *Time and Narrative* where Ricœur uses the term “narrative identity” for the first time, alleging that the unity of self can be guaranteed only by narrative identity. We would like to raise some questions concerning these theses and to point out some difficulties inherent in the concepts of narrative identity. Namely, we argue that Ricœur himself – although he is criticizing Heidegger and Husserl for making such presuppositions - has to presuppose the unity of the self: He understands this presupposed unity of the self as a unity of sense of narrative.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.45 pm, LA 173
Chair: Cathy Maloney

Reinach on Corporate Crime

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Recent media blockbuster court cases like Enron, WorldCom and Conrad Black have revealed that often the object of corporate crime is unique since it arguably does not exist: after documents are shredded, earnings deceptively reported, or non-compete

payments conflated, the actual crime itself does not exist in the same way that a violent crime like murder does, where a weapon or the results of the act itself are present, thus proving difficult to prosecute and punish. The phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, and especially its legal dimensions, can help us here since he accounts for a third type of object that subsists in a way that is neither ideal nor real – the state of affairs. The radically contextual object of corporate crime is a state of affairs, and once this has been established we will be in a better position to speak about the crime committed and culpability.

Saturday 27 October, 9.45 to 10.45 am, LA 173

Chair: Anton Petrenko

Olympism vs. Cybersport: A Philosophical Collision

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The Olympic Games are a biannual festival imbued with the spirit of Olympism and the celebration of athletic excellence. The philosophy of Olympism has evolved throughout history from Ancient Greece to the present. It is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will, and mind through sport. Despite the lofty ideals of the Olympic Games for peace and humanity, these ideals have been eroded over time. Most recently, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has recognized sedentary types of game as sport. One of the growing issues in the area of sport and physical education is the development and proliferation of video games, or cybersport. Cybersport has attracted a strong following, and has endeavored to enter the realm of real or true sport. This paper will explore the concept of Olympism and examine how the Olympic movement has proceeded in society, based on the literature within the philosophy and history of sport. It will explain how cybersport, which has expanded along with the advance of technology, will influence the sporting participation of children and adolescents. It seeks to determine whether cybersport may or may not be justified within the realm of true sport.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.45 pm, LA 176

Chair: Gil Shalev

Is the Right to Have an Abortion a Positive or Negative Right?

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Should abortion services be regarded as an entitlement, like any medically necessary procedure, in which the state (at least in Canada) is required to provide funding and facilities? Or is the state merely required to desist from hindering access to abortion through criminal prohibition? I will provide a defense of abortion as a positive right: as part of a woman's reproductive healthcare that should be funded and serviced by the state. To make my case I will draw on relational theory. A woman's right to reproductive self determination ought not to be illusory, and such a right would be illusory if access to abortion (and thus control over one's reproduction) is not supported through the state's provision of adequate services and women are prevented from using those services because of financial reasons. I will also explore concerns about equality as they are expressed in section 15 of the Charter, as well as section 7 and its concept of fundamental justice.

Friday 26 October, 1 to 2 pm, LA 283
Chair: Eli Diamond

The Role of Hope in Environmental Ethics

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There is, at present, a lacuna in environmental ethical thought pertaining to the role of hope. The goals of this paper are twofold. First, I will make the case that hope is an important concept for environmental ethics. Second, I will begin some preliminary work on how such a concept might be fruitfully developed in the context of environmental ethics. Acting in ecologically responsible ways seems to demand that there is hope for a future where such actions will bring about a degree of conservation or preservation. In the absence of hope, such actions lack justification. An interesting complication is the fact that the presence of hope can facilitate bringing into being a state of affairs more likely to serve as justification for future hope. In other words, hope may serve as a precondition for positive change in behaviors toward the environment, and it is that very positive change that serves to further the cause for future hope.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 176
Chair: Stephen Haller

Care and Communicative Action

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In this paper, I examine the speech acts which take place during the activities of care when they are regulated by a third party such as a for-profit agency. Care labour is varied and my discussion centers on the paid tasks of care that help adult individuals accomplish the activities of daily living (ADLs), or custodial care. I first look at the role of emotional labour within custodial care. Second, I analyse the speech acts that take place during custodial care labour, in particular those associated with emotional labour. I make the case that such acts are communicative actions, in the Habermasian sense, even if they occur in the world of waged work. Finally, I suggest that attention to such speech acts reveals the importance of communicative actions within the labour process. In a market that emphasizes the commodification of services, this is often obscured, if not obliterated.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 175
Chair: Stephen Haller

Indicative/Subjunctive, Accident, Oversight

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The indicative/counterfactual distinction structures contemporary debates in conditional semantics. Most theorists proceed by offering a theory of indicative or counterfactual conditionals, and either trying to extend their analysis to the other variety or arguing that the other variety requires a radically different analysis. This paper examines the distinction from a syntactic and historical perspective. Historical research reviews early versions of the distinction found in Broad, Lewis, Chisholm, and Firth. The distinction is found to be syntactically confused and a product of philosophical shortsightedness and historical accident. It is a commonplace that concept development and theory development go hand in hand. Sometimes theoretical developments force conceptual change upon us. Other times conceptual change can remove roadblocks that have hindered theoretical progress. I conclude that our semantic endeavour will progress if we replace our current taxonomy with one that is syntactically well motivated.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 275
Chair: Glen Hoffmann

An ethical debate: Exercise as a disciplinary action

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Today's way of life is presenting too many challenges for the public at large to embrace exercise and physical activity. Adults are too busy, children lack interest, and technology

is advancing recreation and leisure into unhealthy, sedentary activities. Alongside these current challenges, negative perspectives are often formed. For example, negative perspectives can be formed by through the act of adopting exercise as a form of punishment. Such negative relationships will not promote future participation. I support the belief that Positive perspectives of exercise and physical activity are essential for increasing participation in exercise activities and hopefully reversing health trends. The aim of this paper is to present an ethical debate surrounding the consequences of adapting exercise or physical activity as a form of discipline or punishment. I will take the position that the use of exercise in this nature is (1) demeaning to the inherent good that exists in performing exercise and (2) a risk to the health and wellness of children and adults based on current health trends.

Saturday 27 October, 8.30 to 9.30 am, LA 275
Chair: TBA

The Purpose of Business is the Purpose of Ethics: To Generate Social Wealth

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Much public and scholarly debate has focused on the thesis that the purpose of business is to pursue profits. If by “purpose” we mean “social purpose,” and if by “pursue profits” we mean the unfettered pursuit of profits, then that thesis is plainly false. The unfettered pursuit of profits is neither socially advantageous nor sustainable. But even suitably amended to say “the social purpose of business is to pursue profits within the limits of law and ethics,” this thesis is flawed, because it confuses ends with means. The practice of profit-seeking is not justified for its own sake, but rather is justified by its contribution to a bona fide social good, namely the generation of social wealth. This point of view brings the purpose of business into line with the purpose of ethics, which, from a broadly functionalist and consequentialist point of view, is to increase human well-being.

Saturday 27 October, 1.30 to 2.30 pm, LA 271
Chair: Letitia Meynell

The Subject of Distributive Justice

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Rawls's claim in *A Theory of Justice* that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of distributive justice, is the subject of a recent debate amongst a number of influential contemporary political philosophers. Parties to this debate, including G.A.

Cohen, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Pogge, assume that the question of the right subject of justice is independent of the question of the right theory of justice, such that the project of distributive justice is constituted by two independent questions: the question of the right principles of justice, and the question of the scope of their application. In this paper, I challenge this assumption. I argue that the question of the right subject of justice is dependent on the question of the right theory of justice: the answer a theory provides to the question of the right subject of justice is a direct implication of its fundamental normative commitments.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 174

Chair: Warren Heiti

If You Wrong Her, Shall I Not Revenge?

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There are few defenses of vigilante avengers in moral philosophy. Even retributivists tend to rely on Nozick's distinction between retribution and revenge, thus endorsing only the former. Peter French, however, has offered an intriguing defense of 'virtuous vengeance,' based upon the moral authority of the avenger. This moral authority depends ultimately on the avenger's status as a primary or secondary victim of the wrongdoing. French's position is provocative and relatively unpopular. Yet support may have arisen from a very different area of moral philosophy. Recent discussions of forgiveness have claimed, almost unanimously, that forgiveness is solely the prerogative of the victim(s) of wrong. Acts of forgiveness cannot legitimately be performed by any third parties. In this paper, I argue that critics of third party forgiveness may inadvertently endorse the kind of 'avenger's authority' that French describes. This conclusion gives us at least one good reason to reconsider third party forgiveness.

Saturday 27 October, 11 am to 12 noon, LA 275

Chair: Steven Burns

Skeptical Theism and Moral Obligation

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So-called "skeptical theism," the most prominent philosophical answer to the problem of evil to emerge in recent decades, claims that the probability of a perfect God's existence isn't at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrendous suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical

theists argue, it shouldn't surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God's existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the second.

Friday 26 October, 11 am to 12 pm, LA 176
Chair: Sheldon Wein

Encountering Alterity in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

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Beginning with the premise that in order to be legitimately responsive to the needs of others a genuine understanding of the other's meaning is required, this paper examines Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in terms of the apprehension of alterity. Specifically, this paper will explore the underlying concept of experience that is at play, the movement of dialectical thinking, and the idea of absolute knowing. All of this is considered in relation to dialogical understanding and Gadamer's theory that understanding moves through particulars toward a "higher universality".

Hegel Symposium in Honour of H.S. Harris, Saturday 27 October, 9.45 am to 12 noon,
LA 174
Chair: Stephen Boos

Non-symbolic Turing Machines

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Turing machines are normally conceived of as symbol manipulators and Searle has argued that, as such, they cannot be what we are, for such machines cannot know what they are doing or be conscious in any way. I argue, following a hint from Ned Block's "Troubles With Functionalism," that Turing machines can be understood as non-symbolic manipulators and, as such, can be conscious and, presumably, that that is what we are.

Friday 26 October, 1 pm to 2 pm, LA 271
Chair: Kirk Emery

Virtue theory and environmental ethics

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In a recent article on ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics,’ Rosalind Hursthouse asks whether it is possible for members of societies whose very existence depends on ‘despoiling nature’ to live well in the sense of being virtuous. Hursthouse suggests that while we lack the relevant virtues, children may be inculcated with the relevant forms of practical reasoning to live virtuously. In this paper I offer a more optimistic view of our possibilities making use of a model of practical reasoning based on McDowell’s account of virtue as a reliable sensitivity to salience and Wiggins’ account of the practical syllogism. In this account of virtue it is possible to explain how ordinary people can, and do, display practical wisdom and a virtuous sensitivity to the salient local and global dimensions of the environmental problem that belies overly pessimistic accounts of the problem of ecological thinking. There is good evidence that effective social action need not entail extreme and immediate changes in lifestyle.

Saturday 27 October, 11 am to 12 noon, LA 173
Chair: Gabriela Tymowski

Force of/as Law: Relation in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*

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Relation is central to Hegel’s dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Yet the apparent obviousness of this claim has, perhaps, resulted in a failure to truly understand its implications. For the centrality of relation to the dialectic makes necessary the thinking of difference within identity itself, as that which determines identity. As a result, the stability of identity will always be in question, and the end result of the dialectic is its beginning, the necessity of the thinking of relation. This idea of relation is of vital importance to the notoriously difficult section of Hegel’s text entitled “Force and the Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World.” In this section, understanding comes upon the concept of force in order to explain the world and its laws. This paper will argue that the dialectic of law, culminating in what Hegel refers to as the ‘inverted world’, or difference and change within the same, must be read as a theory of difference. Following from this, Hegel’s dialectic, rather than entailing teleological closure, should be understood as an openness towards future change and possibility.

Hegel Symposium in Honour of H.S. Harris, Saturday 27 October, 9.45 am to 12 noon,
LA 174

Chair: Stephen Boos

What is So Offensive About the Marketing of Pharmaceuticals?

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This paper examines the marketing techniques employed by the North American pharmaceutical industry. It is apparent that the promotion of drugs is done, at least in part, by medicalizing human functions. This practice offends critics. To illustrate why medicalization is so offensive, I consider some prominent objections, including deception, the potential to displace the wellness of patients and paternalism. I conclude that each of these objections contributes to the hijacking of consumers' ability to make rational choices about their health-care, and this consequently undermines their well-being. Since our health should remain inviolate as a primary good, these marketing techniques are pernicious and ethically bankrupt.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 271
Chair: Chris MacDonald

Freedom of Expression and Emotional Harm

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Emotional harm is no less truly harm than is physical harm. That fact stands as an objection to the argument that since words, drawings, photographs, dances, songs, and the rest cannot by themselves cause physical harm, we ought to be free to express whatever we want however we want to whomever we want. We who advocate wide freedom of expression, then, must argue that harm though it is, emotional harm does not, overall, constitute sufficient grounds for suppressing or censoring or punishing expression. I supply a two-part argument to this conclusion. The first part emphasizes the relation between freedom of expression and respect for persons, the second considers the bad consequences socially of restricting expression.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 283
Chair: Mike Hinds

Operationalizing Oppression

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In this paper I propose an account of oppression that is intended to respond to certain criticisms of traditional feminist theories. My account is modeled on natural selection in evolutionary biology, and, indeed, I suggest replacing the term ‘oppression’ in a number of contexts with the terms ‘selected in’ and ‘selected out’. My central idea is that some aspects of evolutionary biology are useful for modeling the situation of various identifiable social populations and explaining why their members succeed or fail in pursuing certain ends. So for instance, explanations of why there are so few women scientists of colour, would examine how people in general get selected into science and how women, people of colour and women of colour get selected out. While such an approach may evoke suspicions of social Darwinism, this misrepresents the project. Natural selection is only a model, ‘fitness’ in this context is not reproductive success, but simply success or ‘survival’ in a particular domain.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.45 pm, LA 275
Chair: Chris Lirette

Passing Powers Around

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There is a view that each distinct property of a thing is associated with a distinct causal power or disposition of it. Some would go further, urging that properties just are nothing more than the causal powers of things. Such a view has been attacked, however. It has been said that causality would become nothing more than the passing around of powers and that nothing would ever, therefore, pass from potentiality to actuality. I attempt in this paper to defend the causal powers view of properties against this line of attack. Causation as a passing round of powers is on reflection quite an attractive characterization and to say that everything would be potential rather than actual is to misunderstand the theory. Powers can be understood as potencies but where to be potent is to be actual rather than merely potential.

Saturday 27 October, 1.30 to 2.30 pm, LA 174
Chair: Kim Jaray

Non-Falsifiability: What’s the Problem?

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Most find the pronouncement “‘God exists’ is meaningless” not only offensive, but clearly wrong. Apart from heart-felt question begging complaints, I shall note the following five objections to the principle of non-falsifiability: (i) even scientists’ pet hypotheses are non-falsifiable in practice; (ii) some very sensible and true claims are non-falsifiable; (iii) while universal claims are falsifiable, but not verifiable, certain particular claims are verifiable, but not falsifiable – yet meaningful and often true; (iv) the presuppositions of science are non-falsifiable; and (v) the criterion of non-falsifiability is itself non-falsifiable, so is self-defeating. I shall contend that these standard complaints against the principle of non-falsifiability confuse *a priori* claims with *a posteriori* claims (ii, iii, v), or unspecified particular claims with specified particular claims (iv), or confuse practice with theory (i). Thus, the phrase “God exists” is problematically non-falsifiable in ways that, for example, “everything has a natural cause” is not.

Friday 26 October, 2.15 to 3.15 pm, LA 176

Chair: Andrew Reynolds

Dialectic and Dramatic: the Evolution of Platonic Play in Marcel

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Marcel’s place in the scheme of the Platonic echo may be one of the more unique contributions to philosophical discourse, as Marcel’s voice does not reverberate metaphysical assertions, or wax political; instead Marcel echoes the essentiality of play within the philosophical. ‘Play’, in Marcel’s manner, can be interpreted both literally and figuratively as the embodiment of Marcel’s philosophical work comes about through his plays, or dramatic writings, and through the interplay of two opposing voices within these works. In this way, I intend to delve into the playful nature of dialogue and dialectic in order to ascertain the nature of the relationship between medium and message. So too, it is key to uncover the nature of the difference between dialogue and dialectic, in order to unwrap Marcel’s contribution to neo-Platonism.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 275

Chair: Luke Callanan

Temporal Becoming

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Two modern competing theories of time and objects within time are presentism and four-dimensionalism. The former is based on our experience of a transient present that has both epistemic and ontological priority. The latter is a direct consequence of the special theory of relativity and suggests that objects have existence throughout all time as much as the present—that all times are as “real” as the present. One of the proponents of four-dimensionalism is Ted Sider, who suggests—without elaboration—that while it is mostly a 20th Century view, it can also be found in ancient Buddhist thought. This suggestion seems inconsistent with even a superficial understanding of the Buddhist theory of impermanence. While the Western views—even presentism—are justification for belief in the persistence of objects through time, the Buddhist denies this belief, instead promoting a view that objects do not survive even a moment. I will examine the relativistic foundation of four-dimensionalism and its debate with presentism, and find that the Buddhist view has relevance to both.

Friday 26 October, 11.00 am to 12.00 pm, LA 187
Chair: Jeremy Proulx

The Ethical Boundaries of Indoctrination

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Recent years have seen a rise in the emergence of organizations concerned with various forms of religious, political, and ideological education, or, as some might argue, indoctrination of youth and children. Such institutions take a variety of forms: from Bible camps in the US and the summer camps in Palestine and Syria, to state sponsored political youth organizations in Russia. One of the distinguishing features of these organizations is their top down, institutional approach to the formation of a set of deeply held political or ideological beliefs within a particular age group whose capacity for critical reflection is limited. Such practices raise important ethical questions. After exploring the issue within the context of individual rational autonomy and various educational institutions in general, I will argue that practices of these organizations become ethically unacceptable when they are no longer pursued primarily in the interests of the individual.

Saturday 27 October, 2.45 to 3.45 pm, LA 275
Chair: David White

Bergson’s Encounter with Relativity Theory

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It can be said without hesitation that some of the most influential ideas about time have come from Bergson and Einstein. It can also be said that they represent two radically opposed approaches. This paper examines Bergson's analysis of relativity theory in Duration and Simultaneity, and argues that Bergson's famous errors in interpretation are not outweighed by the contributions he makes to a proper understanding of time in relativity. Specifically, Bergson allows us to see precisely what is wrong with the notion of block time, in which events in the future are already real since they have already happened from some frame of reference. I argue that Bergson's idea that time cannot be separated from duration dovetails nicely with a central insight of relativity; namely, that a single, privileged view of time cannot capture the essence of time as embodied in discordant rhythms of passage.

Saturday 27 October, 9.45 to 10.45 am, LA 176
Chair: Stephen Mumford

Emperors In The Nude: Is Human Rights Intervention on Moral Grounds The New Liberal Imperialism?

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There is growing advocacy for 'a new age of empire' in which Western countries no longer comply with international law and use military force independently of the United Nations. In this paper I examine the theory of humanitarian intervention within the context of cosmopolitanism and human rights. My goal is to address whether human rights intervention on moral grounds is a form of imperialism. I begin by noting the relation between cosmopolitanism and human rights and subsequently outline a case for humanitarian intervention. However, the virtues of international humanitarianism are not without their limitations, not least of which is the capacity to distinguish the real motives of those who favor intervention. I subsequently address how intervention undertaken outside the boundaries of the international community can be an excuse for war-mongering and a means to expand territorial influence. Ultimately, unilateral intervention without any structure of checks and balances is vexing and unacceptable. Consequently, I note the need for a strong and effective international institutional commitment to human rights as a means to curb isolationist military intervention.

Saturday 27 October, 8.30 to 9.30 am, LA 275
Chair: Ami Harbin

Interpreting Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument

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Russell's Gray's Elogy Argument in "On Denoting" is still without a canonical reading, even now beyond its centenary. I wish to isolate the fragment of the argument that has a meaningful philosophical import to derive criteria of adequacy for any interpretation of the passage. After examining Russell's earlier metaphysics of propositions, what Peter Hylton has called "Platonic Atomism," and the problem of the theory of denoting concepts that such a metaphysics requires, I conclude that subtle commitments to ontological perspicuity, and an already mature epistemological thesis (acquaintance), offered Russell good grounds to reject his earlier (incomplete and unmotivated) theory of denoting concepts in favour of his burgeoning theory of descriptions. Contrary to the assertions of other theorists, this rejection is possible without reading into the passages certain radical views which Russell did not hold, including the view that denoting concepts do not (and cannot) exist because they are inconsistent.

Saturday 27 October, 11 am to 12 noon, LA 175
Chair: John Cook

Can cells be intelligent?

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Northwestern University cell biologist Guenther Albrecht-Buehler has become convinced, on experimental grounds, that mammalian cells in tissue culture and in embryogenesis are capable of non-random "intelligent" motile behaviour. He has hypothesized, and claims to have confirming evidence, that the centrosome, a subcellular organelle, acts as the cell's "brain", by means of its component centrioles, a pair of molecular microtubules (the cell's "nerves" and "eyes") which process signals from the cell's environment and help it in making "decisions" about which direction to move, which cells to adhere to and so on. These signals, he argues, are too weak to control the cell's movements and behaviour by force alone, hence the conclusion that the cell is somehow able to process the information and use it to make autonomous and purposive responses. Clearly the ascription of intelligence to a single cell is unusual practice, but why is our initial reaction that such language can at best be mere metaphor? (Albrecht-Buehler's use of scare quotes suggests his own ambivalence or discomfort on this issue.) In this paper I will look at the arguments for maintaining that intelligence cannot be properly attributed to a single mammalian cell (or a unicellular protist) and subject them to closer critical scrutiny.

Friday 26 October, 4.45 to 5.45 pm, LA 187
Chair: Lisa Gannett

How not to argue for the publicity of reasons

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This paper will address several arguments for Christine Korsgaard's thesis of 'the publicity of normative reasons.' The thesis holds, roughly, that all normative reasons for action are 'public' in the sense that a reason for one person to do X, equally provides reasons for others to do X. After distinguishing more from less charitable interpretations of the thesis, I critically evaluate several of her arguments for the thesis. With the aid of Darwall's notion of 'second- personal reasons', I argue that Korsgaard was wrong to claim publicity as a property of normative reasons as such. Rather, the claim is most interesting – and most likely to be true – if it is understood as a claim about (so to speak) the pragmatics of reasons: that is, about the use of reasons in certain kinds of interpersonal address.

Saturday 27 October, 1.30 to 2.30 pm, LA 275
Chair: Peter Schotch

Is there any such thing as informal logic?

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This paper has it all: Polemics and general spleen venting, deeply personal autobiography, mildly embarrassing stories about Trudy Govier, and exciting and unexpected answers to the question posed by the title. It's frankly amazing that one can fit all that into 20 minutes or so, but I have managed it. The essay embeds a discussion of why critical thinking is based on a category mistake and why fallacies are themselves fallacious. This leaves the hard core of informal logic which I describe by analogy with formal logic. Not only is there informal logic, but if various popular hypotheses about validity are correct, there must be. However, it is somewhat unlike the theory imagined by many/most informal logicians.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 175
Chair: Wayne Grennan

Why Not God? The primacy of Certainty of God vs Certainty of Self in Descartes' Meditations (I-III)

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In this paper I would like to argue that Descartes' method of doubt reveals that the type of certainty he is after is not satisfied by the first principle – the cogito (Med II) - but rather by our knowledge of God's existence (Med. III). The cogito - as the first principle to emerge from the limitations of metaphysical doubt - functions primarily to establish the 'thinking' and 'knowing' subject as the necessary condition for there being any knowledge to begin with. Thus it is the necessary precursor to knowledge but not knowledge proper. The cogito serves as the grounds for the possibility of metaphysical certainty, but actual certainty itself is only instantiated through our knowledge of God's existence. Knowledge of God is the first piece of knowledge proper we are certain of, which is what Descartes is after.

Saturday 27 October, 8.30 to 9.30 am, LA 175
Chair: Michael Siebert

Philosophy, Religion, and Politics In Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods*

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Although Cicero presents himself as an impartial observer in the dialogue *On the Nature of the Gods*, his final statement seems to make his allegiance obvious. After an Epicurean, a Stoic, and an Academic give speeches about the nature of the gods, he concludes that the Stoic position is probably true. Cicero would thus seem to ally himself with the Stoics. In this paper, I argue that he does not. When Cicero says that the Stoic position is probably true, he does so in technical Academic terms, showing that his real, private allegiance is with the Academics. This dramatic detail is significant. I claim that it illustrates a normative conclusion about the relation between philosophy, politics, and religion implied by the Academic interlocutor. That is, it illustrates that philosophers should not engage in public, rational evaluation of religion. Public attempts to do this, however well intentioned, will inevitably cause religious scepticism, and this will undermine the political order. Therefore, one ought to keep the rational evaluation of religion private and promote proper religious piety in public, as Cicero's action suggests.

Saturday 27 October, 11 am to 12 noon, LA 176
Chair: Tony Couture

Strategies and Expectations for the Eradication of Global Poverty

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This is a thought experiment regarding the end result of eradicating extreme global poverty. I will begin by assuming that the eradication of poverty has succeeded; every nation which was once extremely poor is now at least minimally wealthy. We must then ask how these various nations will interact with other nations internationally. Of course, not all nations will turn out the same way, and how they turn out will depend a great deal on the way in which poverty is eradicated. I will thus examine various methodologies for eradicating poverty set forth by contemporary authors (Amartya Sen, Jeffrey Sachs, and Thomas Pogge) and consider what they expect a world without poverty to look like. Two conclusions will be drawn: First, what these authors expect may be more than the eradication of poverty can accomplish. Second, any successful methodology for eradicating poverty must be one of practicality and guarded expectations.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 275
Chair: Arnold Bennett

Realism by constraint?

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The usual route to mathematical object-realism goes through the indispensability argument: we can't do physics, say, without real numbers, so we are committed to an abstract object. But some recent work – mathematical fictionalism in particular – has tried to raise roadblocks along that route, claiming that mathematical objects might well be both indispensable and fictional. The suggestion is that we might have all the mathematical goodies without the ontological worries: truth without truthmakers. Perhaps. But in this paper I suggest a different route to object-realism: realism is defended by examining what we can't do, rather than on the grounds of what it enables. In particular, the fact that π is transcendental (i.e. not the solution to an algebraic equation with rational exponents) fully explains a constraint on the range of geometric constructions we can carry out. My illustration will be the impossibility of squaring the circle. That, I argue, delivers a good prima facie case for realism. I also argue that we can bridge the gap between mathematical language and its subject-matter by attending to the semantic function of 'real'.

Saturday 27 October, 8.30 to 9.30 am, LA 271
Chair: Stephen Maitzen

Generating Sense: Schizophrenia and Phenomenological Reduction

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Theories of the phenomenological reduction are subject to fundamental ambiguities as a result of indeclinable commitments to two irreducible themes, viz., transcendental subjectivity and the lifeworld. A generative approach as described by Anthony Steinbock is well-suited to respond to this predicament. However, the core notion of ‘generativity’ needs to be radicalized on the basis of phenomenological-psychopathological insights concerning the norms of personal historical narrativity. Indeed, psychopathological encounter is paradigmatic of phenomenological practice, inasmuch as it manifests elementarily the movement from non-sense to sense. This suggests that investigation of such encounter has the potential to lead to a richer and more coherent account of the practical and intersubjective dimensions of phenomenological reduction in general.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 187
Chair: Mark Mercer

Athletes, social prominence and role model obligations

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Athletes are heralded in many societies as celebrities, and experience persistent media coverage and scrutiny of virtually every aspect of their lives. This social prominence for athletes gives them significant power to influence others. Since children are easily influenced by others, and since they—particularly boys—identify athletes as being most influential in their lives, then athletes are role models for young people, regardless of whether they wish to be considered as such. Aristotle believed that we learn to be moral—or virtuous—by modeling the behaviour of moral individuals. When children’s behaviour becomes habitual, and that behaviour is modeled after their role models, then they become virtuous out of habit. As such, following Aristotle’s view, it would be the moral duty of adults to behave as good role models so that their actions would be positive influences for children and all others, and would thus contribute to the development of good communities for all citizens. Given the power of athletes to influence the behaviour of others, it is not their choice to make whether to be role models: they are role models because of their social prominence. As such, athletes are morally obligated to behave virtuously.

Friday 26 October, 3.30 to 4.30 pm, LA 176
Chair: Anna Bullen

Possibility and A Posteriori Metaphysical Necessity

Shawn Warren

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Kripke's a posteriori necessity inspired the introduction of two-dimensional semantics to modal reasoning. Relying on two-dimensionalism, Chalmers and Jackson argue that logical and metaphysical considerations do not delineate distinct types of possibility and necessity. That is, the set of possible worlds over which logical and metaphysical modalities range is the same. This is mistaken. There are in fact three "dimensions" of possibility, when metaphysical possibility is properly divided along a priori and a posteriori lines. Our concepts not only contain a priori logical implications that instruct what is conceivable, but also a priori metaphysical implications. These metaphysical conceptual commitments instruct what is conceivable in thought experiment and do so while ignoring any a posteriori metaphysical necessities. In this way it makes sense to maintain a distinction between logically and metaphysically possible worlds. Two-dimensionalism overlooks this taxonomy of possibilities, reducing the metaphysically conceivable/possible to what is a posteriori metaphysical necessity.

Friday 26 October, 1 to 2 pm, LA 275

Chair: Paul Bernier

Playboy Centerfolds and Athletic Goddesses: The Sexual Objectification of Women Athletes

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From a North American liberal feminist philosophical approach, I will argue that there is something objectionable about the persistent sexual objectification of women athletes. Specifically, I will analyze some examples of athletes who have posed in pornographic magazines and or fundraiser calendars. I will maintain that there is something different about sport compared to mainstream society—we should be concerned with the increasing trend of women athletes posing nude despite an overt hyper sexualized society. Discussions of hyper heterosexuality and homophobia will occur in order to satisfy the claim that some women athletes choose to pose nude in order to avoid harsh stereotypes and stigmas. This paper will not include a full blown discussion on the differences between pornography and art; instead the purpose is to present some arguments as to why I consider it problematic and worthy of moral evaluation.

Friday 26 October, 1 to 2 pm, LA 187

Chair: TBA

Authority, Attitude, Superstition, and Religion

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Humans have developed a multitude of social control devices to coordinate their behavior and to thereby improve the prospects for individual and collective success. This paper examines four such devices—superstition, religion, morality, and law—and argues that the insights developed by philosophers of law regarding how to distinguish between law and morality can be productively employed to distinguish between superstition and religion. It is further argued that the application of criteria originally used to distinguish between law and morality to the task of distinguishing between superstition and religion provides us with insight into how religion might be a natural kind even given that systems of belief believed to be dangerous to non-adopters are uniquely accorded the label “religion”. Finally, the paper tells us something regarding when to best deploy each device.

Friday 26 October, 1 to 2 pm, LA 176
Chair: Chris Kaposy

Sentimentalism and the Inescapability of Morality

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It is widely thought that grounding morality in rationality can account for how the requirements of morality are unconditional, inescapable, categorical, necessary, overriding, and binding on all moral agents while grounding morality in natural human sentiments cannot. Defenders of moral sentimentalism often accept this claim and argue that morality need not have these features. Morality can be based on hypothetical imperatives (Foot, Harsanyi) or can be relative to particular moral communities (Harman). Others also agree that moral rationalism is better placed to explain these features, but that is just so much the worse for morality (Mackie). But these concessions are premature. The moral sentimentalist can and should reject the claim that moral rationalism is explanatory superiority with regard to these features of morality. More specifically, the sentimentalist can offer as strong an explanation as the rationalist can for the inescapability and categorical nature of morality.

Saturday 27 October, 4 to 5 pm, LA 175
Chair: Tim Christie